DRE US Supreme Court Cases

Domestic Relations Exception – Supreme Court Cases

1. US. v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 186 L. Ed. 2d 808 (2013)
2. Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 159 L. Ed. 2d 98, 188 Ed. Law Rep. 17 (2004)
3. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 119 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1992)
4. Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 72 S. Ct. 398, 96 L. Ed. 448 (1952)
5. Ohio ex rel. Popovici, State of v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 50 S. Ct. 154, 74 L. Ed. 489 (1930)
6. De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 26 S. Ct. 485, 50 L. Ed. 765 (1906)
7. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906)
8. Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 21 S. Ct. 555, 45 L. Ed. 810 (1901)
9. Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 20 S. Ct. 58, 44 L. Ed. 115 (1899)
10. Burrus, Ex parte, 136 U.S. 586, 10 S. Ct. 850, 34 L. Ed. 500 (1890)
11. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. 582, 21 How. 582, 16 L. Ed. 226, 1858 WL 9327 (1858)

 

An important part of the federal judges’ manufactured justification for their judicially fabricated DRE jurisdictional rule is the use the Barber v. Barber US Supreme Court case to claim that the DRE rule has been in place since 1858. In fact, the Barber v. Barber case was a split decision where the minority wrote that “[i]t is not in accordance with the design and operation of a Government…. [to] assume to regulate the domestic relations of society….with a kind of inquisitorial authority, enter the habitations and even into the chambers and nurseries of private families, and inquire into and pronounce upon the morals and habits and affections or antipathies of the members of every household…..whether expressly conferred upon the State courts, or tacitly assumed by them, their example and practice cannot be recognised as sources of authority by the courts of the United States. The origin and the extent of their jurisdiction must be sought in the laws of the United States.”

“The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed ‘essential,’1 ‘basic civil rights of man,’2 and ‘rights far more precious . . . than property rights.’3 ‘It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’4 The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 and the Ninth Amendment.” 5 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-13, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551 (1972):

1 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923)

2 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 111 0, 111 3, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942)

3 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953)

4 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 1 58, 1 66, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944)

5 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed. 2d 510 (1965)

6 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1 21 2–13, 31 L.Ed. 2d 551 (1972)

“Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a state’s duty toward children.” Frankfurter, J., concurring in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953).

“It is firmly established . . . that . . . wherever possible, the best interests of a child lie in his being nurtured and guided by both of his natural parents.” Daghir v. Daghir, 92 A.D.2d 191,193,441 N.Y.S.2d 494 (2d Dept. 1981).

“Interference with the relationship between the child and the noncustodial parent is ‘an act so inconsistent with the best interest of the child that it raises a strong presumption that the offending parent is unfit to act as custodial parent.’” Prugh v. Prugh, 298 A.D.2d 569 (2nd Dept. 2002).

“The fostering of a relationship with the noncustodial parent is an important consideration in a custody determination.” Matter of Esterle v. Dellay, supra, 281 A.D.2d at 726.

“A parent’s desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection… [P]arent’s interest in accuracy and justice of decision to terminate parental status is an extremely important one.” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed. 2d 640 (1981).

In New York State where Manuel P. Asensio, and if daughter, Eva Asensio, filed the nation’s first criminal indifference to civil rights case against the Hon. Chief Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and the federal judges on the surface the case law gives that appearance that

“Neither decisional rule nor statute can displace a fit parent . . . the courts and the law would, under existing constitutional principles, be powerless to supplant parents except for grievous cause or necessity in which the principle is plainly stated and stressed as more significant than other essential constitutional rights . . . The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children come(s) to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements . . . It is firmly established . . . that . . .wherever possible, the best interests of a child lie in his being nurtured and guided by both of his natural parents . . . Interference with the relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent is ‘an act so inconsistent with the best interest of the child that it raises a strong presumption that the offending parent is unfit to act as custodial parent . . . The custodial parent’s anger, hostility and attitude toward the non-custodial parent can substantially interfere with her ability to place the needs of the children before her own in fostering a continued relationship with then on custodial parent . . . Furthermore, the custodial parent’s conduct can be so egregious as to warrant a change of custody . . . The fostering of a relationship with the noncustodial parent is an important consideration in a custody determination.” Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 548, 356 N.E.2d 277, 282-83 (1976) Daghirv. Daghir, 92 A.D.2d 191,193,441 N.Y.S.2d 494 (2d Dept. 1981) Prugh v. Prugh, 298 A.D.2d 569 (2nd Dept. 2002) Young v. Young, 212 A.D.2d 114, 123 (2nd Dept. 1995) Landau v. Landau, 214 A.D.2d 541 (2nd Dept. 1995) Matter of Esterle v. Dellay, supra, 281 A.D.2d at 726.

“The right to be heard is fundamental to our system of justice . . . [and p]arents have an equally fundamental interest in the liberty, care and control of their children.”  In re Jung, 11 N.Y.3d 365 (N.Y., 2008).

“The right of a parent to the custody and control of a minor child is one of our fundamental rights as United States citizens.” Mark N. v. Runaway Homeless Youth Shelter, 189 Misc. 2d 245, 733 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Fam.Ct. 2001).